Twenty years after signing its headquarters agreement with the International Organisation for Migration, Niger is seeking to usher in a new phase of cooperation. Migration governance, reintegration, youth employment, the diaspora and local development must now be more closely integrated with the priorities defined in Niamey. This repositioning, however, is part of a longer-standing trend: as early as 2020, the country had adopted a national migration policy running until 2035.
On 8 October 2026, in Niamey, the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the headquarters agreement between Niger and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) was not merely a commemorative event. Rather, it provided the Nigerien authorities and the UN organisation with an opportunity to outline the terms of a new phase in their cooperation.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cooperation and Nigeriens Abroad, Bakary Yaou Sangaré, announced plans for a new joint action plan focusing in particular on migration governance, the protection of migrants, resilience, youth employment and the mobilisation of the diaspora.
This plan is yet to be implemented. It would therefore be too early to assess its results. However, its direction reflects a clearly expressed intention: to strengthen the Nigerien state’s role in shaping migration policies carried out in collaboration with international partners.
A Migration Policy That Did Not Begin in 2023
The current policy shift cannot, however, be understood solely through the lens of the political upheavals that have occurred since July 2023.
Back in September 2020, Niger had already adopted a National Migration Policy for the period 2020–2035. This policy is built around four pillars: harnessing local economic opportunities; protecting and assisting migrants and host communities; managing migration flows; and building resilience to climate change.
In July 2025, the authorities renewed their efforts to publicise this policy in Agadez. On that occasion, the Minister of the Interior, Major General Mohamed Toumba, called on the public not to view migration solely through the prism of its negative effects, but also as a phenomenon offering economic opportunities. This development was documented by Dialogue Migration in an analysis devoted to the National Migration Policy.
This institutional continuity highlights a key point: the desire to better integrate migration, local development, protection and the management of migration flows existed prior to the diplomatic rift with several Western partners.
What has changed today relates more to the way in which Niamey intends to implement this policy, negotiate its partnerships and set its own priorities.
Twenty Years of Cooperation with the IOM, However, a Shift in Rhetoric
The headquarters agreement between Niger and the IOM dates back to 2006. Two decades later, cooperation covers a much broader spectrum than simply assistance to migrants: border management, protection of people on the move, community resilience, data collection, responses for displaced populations, health, social cohesion and mobilisation of the diaspora.
During the ceremony on 8 October 2026, Bakary Yaou Sangaré highlighted, in particular, the IOM’s ‘Sahel Approach’, which was put forward to the member states of the Confederation of the Alliance of Sahel States on the sidelines of the International Diaspora Forum held in Bamako in July.
According to the minister, this approach should help build a partnership led by the States and based on dialogue and the priorities defined by the countries concerned. For her part, the IOM’s Deputy Director General, Ugochi Daniels, noted that the organisation wished to continue its support in line with the priorities of the Nigerien government, according to the report published by the Nigerien Press Agency.
Since 2023, this principle of national control has become more prominent in Nigerien political speech. Migration is no exception to this trend.
2015–2023: The Law That Sparked the Debate
To gauge the change underway, one must look back at Law No. 2015-36 of 26 May 2015 on the smuggling of migrants.
Adopted at a time when the European Union was seeking to curb irregular departures towards the Mediterranean, this legislation profoundly altered the economics of the migration routes passing through northern Niger.
Its enactment has notably affected transport operations from Agadez to Algeria and Libya. Several studies have shown that it also impacted the local economy, in which transport operators, accommodation providers, restaurant owners, traders and middlemen derived part of their income from trans-Saharan migration.
Local history is particularly significant in this context. In a report carried out in Agadez more than a year after the repeal of Law 2015-36, Dialogue Migration documents the resumption of certain journeys to the Maghreb and the gradual return of commercial activities linked to travel: the sale of water containers, turbans, protective goggles and other equipment used by desert travellers.
This observation on the ground does not mean that the repeal has resolved the problems associated with migration. Rather, it shows the extent to which, in Agadez, human mobility is intertwined with the local economy.
On 25 November 2023, the Nigerien authorities adopted Order No. 2023-16 repealing the 2015 law. In the official statement reported by Le Sahel, the government argued that the legislation did not take full account of Niger’s interests and certain EU rules on free movement.
The repeal thus represents one of the most striking breaks with the country’s recent migration policy.
However, it has not eliminated the challenges associated with human trafficking, the protection of migrants, irregular migration or the security of Saharan routes.
Rather, it has reignited a fundamental question: how can legal and economic mobility be safeguarded whilst combating criminal networks and protecting travellers exposed to violence, exploitation or the dangers of the desert?
Agadez: a Microcosm of Migration Contradictions
It is in Agadez that this question takes on its most tangible form.
The region remains one of the main crossroads between West Africa, Algeria and Libya. Yet the available data reveal a reality more complex than the simple image of a corridor to Europe.
Between January and March 2026, the IOM recorded 302,892 travellers in northern Niger. Of the movements observed, 43% were internal to the country, 40% were outbound and 17% were inbound. Men accounted for 84% of the travellers observed.
Nationwide, 384,564 movements were recorded at IOM monitoring points in March 2026. The number was 18% higher than that recorded in March 2025, despite a decline from the previous month. The organisation noted, in particular, a sharp increase in outbound movements towards Libya.
These figures suggest that we should move beyond an exclusively European perspective on migration in Niger.
A significant proportion of these movements are work-related, trade-related, family- and regional-based, linked to mining activities, or involve internal mobility. Niger continues to be simultaneously a country of departure, transit, destination and return.
The experience following the repeal of Law 2015-36 also shows that opening up routes does not remove the dangers they pose. Rather, it shifts the responsibility to other measures: regulation of transport operators, convoy security, traveller information, emergency response and cross-border cooperation.
Assamaka Recalls the Human Cost of Saharan Routes
One of the most serious incidents of 2026 served as a stark reminder of this reality.
On 5 June, 49 Nigerien migrants were found dead approximately 80 kilometres west of Assamaka, after their vehicle broke down on the road to Algeria. According to information documented by Dialogue Migration following the tragedy, the victims are believed to have died of dehydration.
The incident has brought back to the forefront of the debate, something that is sometimes overlooked in political discussions: lifting legal restrictions does not automatically make Saharan routes safer.
The Sahara places extreme geographical constraints on travellers. A breakdown, a lack of water, a wrong turn or a group being left behind can quickly prove fatal.
This tragedy therefore serves as a test for the new migration policy: recognising mobility as an economic and social reality also entails developing appropriate prevention, early warning and rescue mechanisms.
Between Mobility and Deportations: Pressure from the North
In addition to these voluntary movements, there are deportations from the Maghreb countries.
The IOM’s response plan for 2026 highlights that Niger continues to receive Nigerien and foreign nationals deported notably from Algeria and Libya, sometimes in extremely vulnerable circumstances.
Assamaka, in the Agadez region, remains one of the main reception points for these people.
This pressure highlights one of the shortcomings of any strictly national approach to migration sovereignty. Niger may determine the rules applicable within its territory, but it remains directly affected by the policies adopted by its northern neighbours.
Migration management therefore also becomes a diplomatic issue.
It requires mechanisms for dialogue on deportations, the identification of individuals, return procedures, consular protection and the conditions under which migrants are returned to Nigerien territory.
From Emergency Assistance to Reintegration
It is precisely in this area that the partnership with the IOM hopes to make progress.
In its 2026 response plan, the organisation plans to support, alongside the Ministry of the Interior, a national platform for the reception, return and reintegration of migrants, under the leadership of the Directorate-General for Civil Status, Migration and Refugees.
The announced objective is to improve the coordination of protection and assistance mechanisms.
The IOM also plans to provide, for certain migrants who have returned voluntarily, mechanisms that may include training, skills certification, employment support, income-generating activities, equipment, grants or microcredit.
The challenge is daunting: to transform one-off aid into sustainable economic capacity.
This approach ties in directly with one of the four pillars of the National Migration Policy 2020–2035: transforming migration more into an economic and social driver rather than solely a security issue.
However, this ambition will need to be assessed on the basis of its results: the number of beneficiaries successfully reintegrated in the long term, income generated, the sustainability of funded activities, access to employment and the real impact on local communities.
The Crucial Issue of Agadez’s Economy
The success of this strategy will depend, in particular, on its ability to generate real economic opportunities.
The experience of the period following 2015 remains instructive. The reduction in some of the activities linked to migrant transport had affected various trades in the north.
Conversely, observations collected in Agadez following the repeal show a resurgence of activities directly associated with convoys and travellers.
The challenge is therefore probably not to phase out the mobility economy.
Rather, it is to enable this economy to operate within a framework that protects travellers, complies with the law, combats criminal trafficking and provides local communities with diversified sources of income.
Oasis agriculture, livestock farming, crafts, tourism, the processing of local products, a formalised mining sector, services and cross-border trade all represent potential avenues.
However, past experience also highlights the limitations of responses based primarily on an accumulation of micro-projects.
Without infrastructure, access to finance, market opportunities and regional economic strategies, individual reintegration risks producing fragile results.
Free Movement: The New Challenge for the AES Area
Another major transformation stems from the withdrawal of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
The departure from ECOWAS immediately raised a question: what will become of free movement for people accustomed to working, trading or joining their families on either side of regional borders?
In an analysis focusing on the consequences of the withdrawal from ECOWAS for free movement in Niger, Dialogue Migration highlights this tension between asserting sovereignty and maintaining human and economic exchanges.
This issue extends far beyond international travellers. In border areas, daily mobility is often an intrinsic part of the local economy.
It affects traders, herders, transport operators, seasonal workers, students and families spread across several countries.
The AES must therefore put in place a framework capable of sustaining this mobility whilst developing its own identification and control mechanisms.
In June 2026, experts from the three countries worked on instruments relating to the free movement of people and goods within the confederal area.
At the same time, Niger has begun rolling out new documents linked to this area.
The AES biometric national identity card was launched in 2026, and the national registration process for the new AES biometric passport officially began in September.
These instruments can facilitate the identification of travellers and enhance the security of travel documents.
However, they do not, on their own, amount to a common migration policy.
Migration Sovereignty: An Ideal Confronted by Reality
Niger has undoubtedly shifted its rhetoric and certain aspects of its migration policy.
Yet the chronology shows that this transformation is more complex than a sudden break between two models.
The National Migration Policy 2020–2035 had already laid the foundations for an approach integrating the economy, protection, migration flow management and climate change. The repeal of Law 2015-36 subsequently altered the legal framework governing migration northwards. The creation of the AES now introduces an additional regional dimension.
The new partnership announced with the IOM could serve as a fourth stage: that of international cooperation organised more closely around the priorities defined by Niamey.
It remains to be seen how this framework will play out on the ground.
For migration sovereignty is not measured solely by a state’s ability to reject a foreign policy.
It is also measured by its ability to monitor the flows crossing its territory, secure the routes, protect vulnerable people, combat criminal networks, organise returns, negotiate with its neighbours, facilitate legal economic mobility and create opportunities in the territories concerned.
Agadez and Assamaka are precisely the places where these ambitions meet reality.
The next test will be that of results
Twenty years after the IOM’s institutional establishment in Niger, the relationship between migration and sovereignty is thus entering a new phase.
The debate is no longer solely about the number of migrants crossing Agadez or the ability of European partners to stem departures towards the Mediterranean.
It now extends to the whole of migration governance: who sets the priorities, according to what rules, with what funding, and with what outcomes for both migrants and Nigerien communities?
The new Niger–IOM action plan announced in Niamey will be one of the first tests of this ambition.
And its effectiveness will likely be judged on three fronts: the safety of people travelling along Saharan routes, the capacity for economic reintegration, and the establishment of a regional framework for mobility consistent with the new guidelines of the African Migration Pact.
